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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEMAR s. WINEGAR and 
LEGRAND WINEGAR, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs- CASE NO. 15504 
SMITH INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action arises out of a dispute concerning the 
interpretation of a lease and the plaintiffs' failure to 
exercise a lapsed option to renew the lease for an additional 
term. Plaintiff's Complaint prays for a declaratory judgment 
interpreting the renewal provisions of the lease, for a 
reformation of the lease pursuant to such judgment and 
damages resulting from the alleged failure of the defendant 
to consent to an assignment of the lease. Defendant's 
position is that the attempt to exercise the option was not 
timely made and seeks attorney's fees under the terms of the 
lease. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury and the trial court 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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entered a judgment against the plaintiffs on the plaintiffs' 
Complaint and each of the causes therein. The t · 1 ria court 
did, however, enter judgment in conformance with the plain-
tiffs' Fourth Cause of Action relative to the removal of the 
improvements and carwash facilities located on the leasehold 
premises and made an order for reasonable attorney's fees 
(R. 62) to defendant. 
Plaintiffs' motion to amend the findings of fact a~ 
conclusions of law was heard and the defendant's motion for 
an order fixing the amount of attorney's fees was also heard 
at that time. Plaintiffs' motions were denied, and the 
defendant's motion for fixing the amount of the attorney's 
fees was taken under advisement (R. 81). On November 4, 1977 
the plaintiffs obtained a stay of the imposition of the 
court's judgment pending this appeal (R. 8 5) • The matter of 
fixing the amount of defendant's attorney's fees has never 
been ruled on by the trial court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment of no cause 
of action on their Complaint, but do not seek reversal of the 
judgment of the court pertaining to the right of the plain-
tiffs to remove the improvements and carwash facilities from 
the leasehold property upon the termination of the lease. 
f · · g of Defendant resists the appeal and reserves the ixin 
fees for the fl..nal remittitur of the amount of attorney's 
-2-
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the case to the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant is the owner of property located at 9200 South 
700 East in Sandy, Utah. Plaintiffs are assignees of a 
lease for a car wash pursuant to an assignment from William 
and Elithe Doxey executed on August 21, 1972. The original 
lessess of the property were Virgil and Thelma Fox, who 
subsequently assigned their interest to the Doxeys (R. 142-43). 
A copy of the Lease is found, R. 7 to 10, and the Amendment 
to Lease, R. 11-12. 
Pursuant to paragraphs four and six of the Lease, the 
original lessees took the leasehold as unimproved property 
for the purposes of constructing and operating a carwash 
thereon. At the time that the Foxes assigned the leasehold 
interest to the Doxeys, the carwash had already been erected 
and the Doxeys acquired the carwash business, improvements and 
facilities from the Foxes. 
On the 9th of January, 1969, the Doxeys executed with 
the defendant an Amendment to Lease (R. 11 and 12 and 144). 
This Amendment to Lease lies at the heart of the dispute now 
before the Court. 
The Amendment was at the request of the Doxeys, but was 
originally drafted by Mr. Reed M. Smith (R. 144). However, 
three changes in the drafted Amendment were made by inter-
lineation in the presence of Mr. Doxey and at his request. 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Smith is, and at all times relevant herein was, the 
President of Smith Investment Company (R. 247). The amend-
ment to the lease originally set forth an enlarged lease 
period of eight years. The calculation of the eight-year 
period was to be from the 15th day of February, 1967. ~ 
the 9th of January, 1969, when Mr. Doxey met with Mr. Smith 
to execute the amendment, several interlineations were made 
on the amending document whereby the term of eight years was 
changed to a term of ten years (R. 145), but further down in 
the language of the paragraph relating to the term of the lea: 
there is a provision relative to the giving of notice of an 
intention to renew. The eight-year period referred to 
therein was not changed by interlineation (R. 152). No 
request was made for changing that period for renewal (R. m1 
The relevant amended provision is quoted below for the 
convenience of the Court. The word enclosed in brackets is 
the portion of the agreement which was crossed out by the 
parties to insert the word "ten." 
2. TERM. The term of this lease shall be for 
a period of ten (eight) years commencing on the. 
15th day of February, 1967, as hereinafter i;irovided, 
with a right of renewal for an additional five 
years upon condition that notice of intention to 
renew is given by the Lessees to the Lessor at. least 
three months prior to the expiration of said eight-
year period, and upon the further condition that the 
rent for the renewal period shall be $200.00 per 
month. 
f the Lease an6 When the plaintiffs took an assignment o 
· cludin° the Amendment to Lease, they read the documents, in · 
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the provision for the eight-year term on the right of renewal 
(R. 189). This assignment was taken by plaintiffs from 
their brother-in-law, Mr. Doxey, and at no time did plaintiffs 
make inquiry of defendant as to any alleged ambiguity or 
lack of understanding of the eight-year period for the renewal 
right. 
The lease term as provided by the Amendment to Lease 
was for ten years, commencing February 15, 1967, and hence 
would expire February 14, 1977. The right of renewal for 
an additional five years is "upon condition that notice of 
intention is given by the Lessees to the Lessor at least 
three months prior to the expiration of said eight-year period." 
So the deadline for giving notice was December 14, 1974. 
Actual notice was not given until August 20, 1976. 
The plaintiffs requested a consent to an assignment of 
the Lease to Mr. Jensen (R. 165, and plaintiffs' Exhibit 8). 
In response to the request of the plaintiffs, Mr. Smith 
wrote a letter to the Winegars dated March 22, 1976, offering 
a conditional consent to the assignment of the lease (plaintiffs' 
Exhibit 9). The precise language of the letter is as follows: 
We will not withhold our consent to an 
assignment when the repair and maintenance work 
is completed and providing we receive financial 
statements and information to qualify the people 
that you are proposing as our new lessees. 
The Winegars undertook some repairs to satisfy 
its terms, which consisted principally of painting of the 
-5-
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buildings, repair of the asphalt, replacement of shingles 
on the roof of the building, and repair of the sign advertis-
ing the carwash (R. 166), all of which could be considered 
routine maintenance pursuant to the terms of the lease, but 
which had been neglected by plaintiffs. 
A financial statement of Mr. Ivan Jensen was mailed 
to the defendant as an enclosure with plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 
10. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10 was mailed on June 10, 1976, by 
certified mail and was received by the defendant (R. 169). 
This letter also contained the plaintiffs' notice that all 
of the repairs and maintenance work required by the con-
ditional consent had been completed. 
In contemplation of the purchase of the carwash and an 
assignment of the lease, Jr. Jensen paid a down payment of 
$5,000 to the plaintiffs as a portion of the purchase pr~e 
(R. 176). The total contract price was $20,000. Short~ 
after the time of the listing of the property by Mr. Jensen, 
the defendant refused to execute a consent to the assignment 
of the lease, because such included an acknowledgment of the 
validity of the notice of intention to renew the lease asg~ 
by plaintiffs in August of 1976, 20 months after the required 
date. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' TWENTY-MONTH DELINQUENCY IN 
ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF RENEWAL 
BLOCKS ANY RECOVERY IN THIS ACTION BY PLAIN-
TIFFS. 
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POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT. 
POINT III 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT TO LEASE 
SETTING EIGHT YEARS AS THE RENEWAL 
PERIOD, ARE CLEAR AND NOT PATENTLY AMBIGUOUS. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS TOOK AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE LEASE 
AND AMENDMENT TO LEASE FROM THEIR 
BROTHER-IN-LAW AFTER READING THE SAME AND 
WITHOUT MAKING INQUIRY OF DEFENDANT, THEREBY 
ACKNOWLEDGING THE UNA.t\IBIGUOUS NATURE OF THE 
LANGUAGE. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH GROUNDS FOR 
REFORMATION OF THE LEASE OR AMENDMENT TO 
LEASE. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT REWRITE THE LEASE AND 
AMENDMENT TO THE LEASE TO SATISFY PLAIN-
TIFFS AND RELIEVE THEM FROM THEIR FAILURE 
TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF INTENTION TO 
RENEW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' TWENTY-MONTH DELINQUENCY IN 
ATTEMPTING TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF RENEWAL 
BLOCKS ANY RECOVERY IN THIS ACTION BY 
PLAINTIFFS. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS SUPPORTED 
BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.AND FINDINGS 
OF FACT. 
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The evidence is without dispute that plaintiffs made 
no attempt to exercise the five-year renewal right set forth 
in the Amendment to Lease, until August 20, 1976. This 
date is over eighteen months beyond the deadline of F b e ruary 
15, 1975 (eight years from February 15, 1967). Thus the 
failure to exercise the right to renew within the eight-year 
period granted by the Amendment wholly eliminated that 
conditional option for renewal. 
This Court has consistently held that where a time is 
fixed for exercise of an option to renew a lease on realty 
or to purchase realty, that time stated is binding. Unless 
the notice of intent to exercise such option is timely given, 
the option right expires and is lost. The most recent of 
these decisions is J.R. Stone Company v. Keate (March 3, 
19 7 8) . This was a lease with an option to purchase. Here 
the attempted exercise of the option was upon terms different 
from the option right. The decision in part says: 
The law requires that one who desires to exer-
cise an option must do so in accordance with its 
terms; and where there is a substantial variance 
between the terms of the option and the offer to 
exercise it, the latter amounts only to a counter 
offer, which the optionor is at liberty to acc~pt. 
or to reject. From what has been said abc;ive :t. 1~ 
plainly apparent that the trial court was JUSt1fie 
in its finding that the plaintiff was ready and 
willing to deliver the proper conveyance upon per-
formance of the conditions of the option by the 
defendant Keate, but that the latter did not make a 
valid exercise of the option. 
In Coombs v. Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P. 2d 356 • 
-8-
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relief was sought by way of specific performance on an 
option for sale and purchase of realty. The time period 
set was June 9, 1966 to January 31, 1967, which was 
extended to July 30, 1967. No tender of payment was made 
until October 2, 1967. Relief was denied and this Court 
affirmed and said: 
If an option contract provides for payment 
of all or a portion of the purchase price in 
order to exercise the option, the optionee, to be 
entitled to a conveyance, must not only accept the 
offer but pay or tender the agreed amount within 
the prescribed time. 
Aiken v. Less Taylor Motor Co., 110 Utah 265, 
171 P. 2d 676, directly considered an option to renew a 
lease. The lease period was October 1, 1941 to September 
30, 1943, with a four-year renewal of lease option. This 
recited, "Lessee hereby agrees to give Lessor 60 day notice 
before expiration of Lease, if not renewed . " 
It is elementary that an option to renew 
contained in a lease must be exercised to effect 
the renewal. Usually affirmative acts are required 
either by the express terms of the lease or by 
implication of law to exercise the option to renew. 
We opine the parties intended that if no notice 
were given 60 days before the end of the two year 
period, the option to renew was thereby exercised 
and the lease was thus renewed. 
In this exceptional case, failure to do anything during the 
60 day period constituted exercise of the option due to 
the unique language. But the time period was controlling. 
As stated by the Court, it is elementary that "an option to 
renew contained in a lease must be exercised to effect 
-9-
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the renewal." 
As in most cases and in the Amendment to Lease now 
before the Court, affirmative action within a stated ti~ 
limit must be taken, otherwise the option to renew lapses. 
This rule was earlier defined by this Court in I.X.L. 
Furniture v. Berets, 32 Utah 454, 91 P. 279, where, in a 
lease for two years ending December 1, 1906, Lessee over-
looked the requirement ;for exercising the right to renew "a: 
the expiration of the term", but made a request on December 
3, 1906, three days late. Relief was sought on the grounds 
of inadvertence and the equitable rule seeking to prevent ti 
fei tures. The trial court denied the requested extension 
and the Supreme Court affirmed. On the plea for equitable 
relief the Court said: 
Finally, it is claimed that the contract 
should be construed and applied most strongly 
against respondents under the equity rule, which 
seeks to prevent forfeitures, and that the acts 
of appellant in seeking a renewal should be favor-
ably considered in its behalf for the same reason. 
But the rule contended for has no application to 
the facts in this case. No forfeiture is involved. 
Appellant, at most, lost nothing but an opportun~ty 
by not performing a condition required of it, which 
was necessary to the enjoyment of a right to an 
additional term, and which was to be paid for when 
obtained. If a man is invited to attend a sale, of 
his neighbor's property at a certain time,.and. 1 s d 
given the right of bidding for and purchasing it, an 
fails to attend the sale at the hour fixed, hem~ 
miss an opportunity, but he forfeits nothing. 5°1 f here, appellant simply lost the right to a renewa 0 
a new term. He forfeited nothing in the legal sense 
that that term is used to respondents. 
-10-
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In the present case before the court, the plaintiffs 
either did not read or misread the figure provision as to the 
time for the exercise of the option to renew. At no time 
did they mention a desire to renew and extend the lease or 
formally seek to exercise such right, until nearly two years 
after the end of the eight-year term for exercise of the 
option. The court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R. 59-62, paragraph 6) specifically found "Plaintiffs 
did not give notice to the defendant of an intention to renew 
the lease three months prior to the expiration of said eight-
year period from February 15, 1967, and plaintiffs were 
advised by defendant that their right to renew had expired." 
Then in paragraph 7 of the Findings the court found: "Defendant 
has done nothing to estop itself from realizing upon and 
enforcing the terms of the lease and said amendment." 
In consequence of said Findings, the court then 
entered its Judgment that the lease terminated on February 14, 
1977 and it is entitled to immediate possession of the premises. 
Said Findings and Judgment are supported by clear and competent 
evidence. At no time did the defendant manifest any intent 
to change the option period beyond the eight years stated in 
the amendment to the lease, nor did defendant or its officers 
at any time represent otherwise to plaintiffs or to their 
predecessors in ownership of the said lease. 
POINT III 
THE PROVISIONS OF THE AMENDMENT TO LEASE 
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SETTING EIGHT YEARS AS THE RENEWAL PERIOD, 
ARE CLEAR AND NOT PATENTLY AYillIGUOUS. 
POINT IV. 
PLAINTIFFS TOOK AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE LEASE 
AND AMENDMENT TO LEASE FROM THEIR BROTHER-
IN LAW AFTER READING THE SAME AND WITHOUT 
MAKING INQUIRY OF DEFENDANT, HEREBY 
ACKNOWLEDGING THE UNAMBIGUOUS NATURE OF 
THE LANGUAGE. 
For the plaintiffs to succeed in the law suit and t~ 
appeal before this court, they must somehow convince the 
court that the amendment to the lease is patently ambiguous, 
or that the same should be reformed to comply with plain-
tiffs' present asserted basis that a ten-year option ~rm 
was intended. We will deal first in this section of the 
brief with the issue of whether or not the lease was patenti 
ambiguous, so as to afford to the plaintiffs a basis for 
placing oral evidence in the record to show an intent other 
than that set forth in the document; or, assuming that the 
"d · "bl h · ·ff di'd prove that' ev1 ence was perm1ss1 e, t at the pla1nt1 s 
there was a mutual mistake or some such other basis upon wh:: 
the court could predicate a change of the lease. The langua: 
of the Amendment to Lease is before the court, and particula:. 
• (R 11-J 
it is Exhibit B attached to the plaintiffs' Complaint · · 
Mr. and Mrs. Doxey at that time were taking an assignment of 
the earlier lease of November 30, 1966 between defendant anc 
· · 1 h l The car wash had been erected V1rg1 c. and T e ma J. Fox. 
a nd the ooxe•' upon defendant's property and was in operation 
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desired that the original lease, which was from February 
15, 1967 for a term of five years, be made a ten-year lease. 
The testimony is clear that at that time the defendant, 
through its President, Mr. Reed M. Smith, was requested to 
prepare an amendment to the lease so as to allow such an 
extension of the term. This he did, and the amendment to the 
lease as drafted and presented for Mr. Doxey's signature 
provided for a term of eight years, commencing on the 15th 
day of February, 1967. When they met for the signing of this 
document (1969) they requested that it be for a full ten 
years because two years had already passed. Mr. Smith agreed 
to this, and there and then, in the presence of each other 
and at the request of Mr. Doxey, the words "eight years" in 
the second line was changed by crossing out "eight" and 
writing over it "ten". Then in the next paragraph relating 
to rental the word "eight" was crossed out and the word "ten" 
inserted, and further down, where it referred to the sixth, 
seventh and eighth years, there was added ninth and tenth. 
Thus the term of the lease by the amendment was extended for 
ten years from February 15, 1967. 
The original lease had contained a five-year right of 
renewal, and thus in the amendment to lease a right of renewal 
was stated as follows: "With a right of renewal for an 
additional five years upon condition that notice of intention 
to renew is given by lessees to the lessor at least three 
-13-
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months prior to the expiration of said eight-year period." 
Plaintiffs contend that by using the language "said eight· 
year period" the document is ambiguous and unintelligible. 
The trial court found squarely against such contention. It 
is to be observed by looking at the document that no questi:· 
should exist, but that "said eight-year period" cleatly~ 
unmistakably meant the term of eight years from the 15th da 
of February, 1967. It is true that the 'eight" in said para· 
graph above the phrase just quoted above, had been lined 01;: 
by a single line and a "ten" written above it and initiale<l 
by Mr. Smith and Mr. Doxey, but such was and is clearly 
legible and unmistakable. The mere fact that the term of t
1 
lease was extended to 10 years did not pro tanto mean that · 
the parties had to agree to a ten-year period for the optio: 
to renew. The allowing of the word "said" to precede the 
I 
eight-year period in the phrase relating to the right of rq 
is not in any way fatal to the language of the Amendment tc 
Lease nor creates an ambiguity therein. Said "eight-year 
period" is clear and unambiguous, and certainly is n~~ 
source of any patent ambiguity such as is asserted and cla:: 
by the plaintiffs-appellants in this case. 
For the appellants to succeed in this matter, they rn~;. 
show that it was the intent of both parties to the proceed~) 
that the renewal period should be three months prior tot~'. 
d ·n the end of ten years instead of eight years, as state 1 
-14-
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amendment. Assuming for the purpose of this brief that the 
court appropriately allowed oral testimony to be admitted 
relative to the intents of the parties, let us look at the 
testimony that is in the record relating to the same. Mr. 
Doxey (R. 148-149), after the court sustained our objection 
to an expression of his "understanding" regarding the renewal 
clause, attempted to testify as to what the conversaions 
were at that time. He stated that "It's impossible to 
remember the exact words that were said in the conversation. 
So all I can tell you is there is no question about the fact 
that the lease was extended and included in that extension 
was the fact that renewal would be extended as well. I can't 
tell you the exact words that were said, but that's the 
intent of the conversation." We moved that it be stricken 
as merely conclusion. The court then asked him directly what 
was his best recollection and he stated that "To the best of 
my recollection, your Honor, the lease was extended from 
eight to ten years, and the Notice of Renewal was also 
extended." Wherever Mr. Smith was asked about these same 
matters (R. 255) he testified "When I presented the amendment 
to Mr. Doxey he said that he understood it was ten years. And 
I said, 'Well, two years have expired. There's eight years. 
Eight and two are ten.' He said, 'No, I would need an 
additional -- I would need the term to be ten years.' And 
we made the changes at ten years." Then counsel attempted 
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to somehow impeach that testimony by saying that Mr. Doxe~, 
and Mr. Smith were on "extremely friendly terms at the fr,· 
which was denied by Mr. Smith, who stated that he had just 
met the man, had never had any prior dealings with him, and 
that this was not a casual thing but an actual statement, 
and the only changes made were initialed by him and by Mr. 
Doxey. 
The record is clear that Mr. Doxey, the brother-i~l~ 
of the plaintiffs-appellants, was an educator, a teacher ar.: 
administrator and had served as a principal in the Granite 
School District (R. 149-150). He, as well as the plaintiffo,' 
testified that they had read the Lease and the Amendment to 
the Lease and had had no questions about it directed to the 
defendant at any time, and Mr. Doxey had the lease in his 
possession from the date in 1969 until his assignment and sa: 
to his brothers-in-law (plaintiffs-appellants) in 1972, and 
the plaintiffs-appellants had the lease from 1972 until the 
time of its expiration in February of 1977. 
The court has dealt with an ambiguity and change in 
the language of a written contract a number of times. one o' 
the more recent decisions is Commercial Building Corpora~ 
v. Blair, ~~-Utah, P. 2d , regarding a 
lease and the interpretations of the same as relating ~a 
parking lot area. There your courts said, 
The rule in the State of Utah, as elsewhere, 
is that parol evidence may be admitted to show the 
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intent of the parties of the language of a written 
contract is vague and uncertain. On the other 
hand, such evidence cannot be permitted to vary 
or contradict the plain language of a contract. 
There is nothing vague or uncertain in the 
lease about whether Lots 25 through 30 are 
committed to parking." 
Plaintiffs-appellants in their brief seem to attempt 
to boost their position on ambiguity by claiming that it is 
a patent ambiguity, and quote the case of University Club v. 
Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2nd 1, 504 P. 2d 29, and 
apparently relying upon some theory that if the parties are 
in sharp disagreement as to the meaning of the contract, that 
it must be a patent case where the rule is that if there is 
any uncertainty or ambiguity in the terms of the contract, 
the court may allow extraneous evidence in order to determine 
what was the true intent of the parties. The problem the 
plaintiffs have with this is that they must first show that 
there was a real ambiguity, not merely that the parties at a 
later date disagreed upon the terms and conditions of the 
contract. Such subsequent disagreement, wherein the plain-
tiffs in this case are trying to say that eight years means 
ten years, is not the basis for the creation of a patent 
ambiguity requiring the court to act. Even if this were the 
case, this court would have to find that the trial judge 
who saw the witnesses and heard their testimony and observed 
the demeanor of parties, was completely mistaken in his 
ruling that the lease where it said eight years, meant eight 
years and did not mean ten years, as to the right of renewal 
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term. In Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 26!, 
501 P. 2d 266, the court allowed the introduction of para: 
evidence to show circumstances under which the agreement., 
made and the purpose for which the instrument was executs:. 
And in dealing with this, the court quoted from Bullough" 
Sims, saying; 
. that when parties place their own 
construction on their agreement and so perform, 
the court may consider this as persuasive evidence 
of what their true intention was. It is true that 
the doctrine of practical construction may be 
applied only when the contract is ambiguous; but 
the question become ambiguous to whom? Where the 
parties have demonstrated by their actions and 
performance that to them the contract meant some-
thing quite different, the meaning and intent of 
the parties should be enforced. 
Let us look at the circumstances before us at the prt:' 
time in this case, At no time did the defendant, Smith 
Investment Company, or its President, Reed M. Smith, say,c: 
imply anything inconsistent with the continuous position 
that the right of renewal was limited to the eight-yell 
period, from February, 1967. When an attempt was made mor: 
than a year after the expiration of said eight-year ~ri~ 
by the plaintiffs to exercise a renewal right, they were 
clearly told that the time had passed. There was no pracu:: 
construction by the defendant that would create either an 
estoppel or a basis of ambiguity at any time whatsoever. 
in the Had the initial words "eight years" that were 
d · been wr 1-. t ten, then thi Amen ment to Lease as its term never 
phrase on the period of time for the exercise of the rio'.1' 
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of renewal "said eight-year period", might possibly be 
construed as being ambiguous. However, the document itself, 
even after the single line through the "eight" and the 
changing to "ten" on the terms of the lease, is clearly 
legible and there can be no confusion or doubt as to what 
this meant by the said eight-year period tagging the length 
of time for the exercise of the right of renewal. It is 
to be recalled that the testimony of Mr. Doxey was that he 
said that he needed a "term to be ten years", but at no time 
asked for a change in the eight-year renewal notification 
period on the amendment to lease as written and presented to 
him. Mr. Smith testified that he was reluctant in making 
the change to the ten-year term, but that he did do it at 
the request of Mr. Doxey (R. 256). Plaintiffs would have the 
court think that there is something magic in having the 
period for the renewal coextensive with the term of the lease. 
That was not the contract of the parties; those were not the 
terms they agreed upon and that is not the language of the 
Amendment to Lease upon which plaintiffs base their claim to 
a renewal and extension of the lease. As Mr. Smith testified, 
there are a number of other tenants in the shopping area, and 
reasonable management of the same dictated that he should know 
Well in advance whether this lease was going to be extended 
or not. We submit that there is no patent ambiguity in the 
document and that there is no occasion for oral testimony or 
other evidence being admitted or considered competent to 
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interpret the document itself. 
POINT V. 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO ESTABLISH A BASIS 
FOR REFORMATION OF THE LEASE OR AMENDMENT 
TO LEASE. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT REWRITE THE LEASE AND 
AMENDMENT TO THE LEASE TO SATISFY PLAIN-
TIFFS AND RELIEVE THEM FROM THEIR FAILURE 
TO GIVE TIMELY NOTICE OF INTENTION TO 
RENEW. 
Apparently in desperation, and realizing that there 
truly was no ambiguity in the phrase giving an eight-year 
period for the exercise of the right of renewal of the lea:' 
plaintiffs seek to have the court reform the lease to con· 
form with their wishes for a ten-year period for the exer· 
cise of the right of renewal. No fraud, no "mutual" mistake 
of fact has been shown, and the trial court did not deem it 
appropriate to attempt to reform and rewrite the contract 
for the parties. The basic reason for reformation of these 
leases and like documents is mutual mistake of fact. This 
court on a number of instances said that the level of proo' 
essential to establish a predicate upon which the court can· 
make a reformation of the written document is "clear and 
convincing proof." See Naisbett v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 115, 
307 P. 2d 620; and Janke v. Beckstead, 2 Utah 2d 247, 332 
P. 2d 933. 
No assertion is made that there was any misrepresenta'.: 
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on the part of the defendant or its President, Mr. Smith, 
nor any fraud, and as stated by this court in Jensen v. Manilla 
corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
~· Utah 2d, ____ P. 2d, 
though parol evidence is permissible in an action for 
reformation to show the writing did not conform to the intent 
of the parties, when there is no evidence of any fraud or 
misrepresentation on the part of the defendant nor any finding 
of such as a basis for granting relief, no such relief will 
be given. 
We do not rewrite the contract, we merely allow 
the writing to be made to conform to the contract 
as made. 
This court is not engaged in the rewriting of contract to 
suit one party, particularly where that one party has had an 
opportunity for many years to exercise a right of renewal 
and has been so dilatory as to allow the time to pass and 
then, without just cause or any other valid legal basis, 
attempts to resurrect the lost right of renewal, no rule in 
law or equity justified intervention of this court in the 
redrafting of the contract to suit the plaintiffs-appellants 
such as in this case. 
Plaintiff, Mr. Lamar "Buzz" Winegar, testified that he 
inspected the Lease and Amendment to Lease when he bought 
out his brother-in-law, Doxey, in 1962. He testified further 
(R. 189) : 
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Q. Did you procure any written opinion from 
any attorney as to this eight-year provision on t~ 
right of renewal? 
A. Not a written opinion. 
Q. You did read the eight-year term in the 
document on this renewal; did you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have known of this ever since the 
time you first negotiated the contract with your 
brother-in-law? 
A. Yes. 
This and other competent evidence in the record negati;, 
completely plaintiffs' claims to ambiguity and claims for 
reformation on the basis of mutual mistake. This and othe! 
competent evidence sustains the Findings of Fact and t~ 
Judgment of the trial court. 
DAMAGES 
The plaintiffs, in addition to asking for reformation 
of the Lease and the Amendment to Lease, are seeking damaai 
for the failure of defendant to give consent to assignment 
of the lease to a prospective buyer. A review of dates wi: 
aid the court in placing in perspective the situation of 
the parties: 
Nov. 
Feb. 
Jan. 
Aug. 
30, 1966 
15, 1967 
9, 1969 
23, 1972 
- date of Lease 
- start of lease term 
- Amendment to Lease 
- Assignment by Doxey to plaintiffs 
-22-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Nov. 15, 1974 Last day for exercise of renewal 
(3 months prior to end of eight years) 
Aug. 20, 1976 - Notice of intent to renew mailed 
Feb. 20, 1977 - end of lease term 
Within the permitted option renewal period and on June 
4
1 
1976, Exhibit 2-P was written by plaintiffs to defendant. 
This letter inquired about even another 5 years. This reads, 
"If we exercise the renewal option (underscoring ours). 
Mr. Winegar acknowledged that said exhibitwas not an exercise 
of the option, but merely negotiation to see if yet another 
five-year option could be added. It seems significant that 
plainitffs, within the designated eight-year period, started 
to consider whether they should seek an extenion of the 
lease. The record does not show whether they then forgot 
about it for two years, or merely had a change of mind. 
It was in March of 1976 when plaintiffs notified defendant 
of a contract to sell the car wash and asked for consent to 
assignment. Apparently plaintiffs had not disclosed to their 
prospective purchaser that plaintiffs had not exercised the 
already expired right of renewal within the stated time, and 
that the lease would expire on February 15, 1977. This non-
disclosure was not known to defendant. So Mr. Smith wrote 
that defendant would not withhold consent if the repair and 
maintenance work, which should have been done earlier by 
plaintiffs, were completed and the necessary financial state-
ments be assignee were supplied. At no time did the 
prospective purchaser-assignee contact defendant concerning 
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the lease provisions. The terms of the prospective sale 
by plaintiffs were never revealed to defendant (R. 171). 
When Mr. Smith saw a real estate listing card which 
referred to "gross sales of the car wash for the first 
quarter 1976, amounting to nearly five thousand dollars", 
he wrote to plaintiffs questioning such representations,,, 
such did not conform with plaintiffs' lesser income report: 
to defendant (R. 172). Later, "Buzz" Winegar, one oft~ 
defendants, testified that when he talked to other prosper· 
tive purchasers of the car wash "and when they learned of 
the terms of our lease they were no longer interested." 
Plaintiffs did not deal directly with defendant, b~ 
used a real tor, a Mr. Densley, who was not called by plaint 
to testify. The prospective buyer, Mr. Jensen, was called 
and testified. To reflect his uncertainty about the rene1a: 
he said (R. 223) he became aware of the problem and though 
it was not in the Uniform Real Estate Contract prepared bi 
plaintiffs, 
A. Yes, this is the Uniform Real Estate Contrac: 
which we signed at the time that we gave Mr. Winegar 
the balance of the $5,000.00 down and agreed to pur· 
chase it from him. There was one stipulation. 
don't think it's in here, though. 
Q. What was that? 
A. No, it's not stated in here. Well, that he 
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had to furnish me a lease from Mr. Smith for the 
additional five years from February, which was when 
the lease was -- as near as I can remember -- come 
up for renewal. 
And if he couldn't furnish me with this 
additional lease, why, then he would refund all that 
I had given him. 
It was apparent that they both realized that the renewal 
right had expired and that the plaintiffs "had to furnish 
me a lease from Mr. Smith for the additional five years from 
February." Not once did Mr. Jensen contact Mr. Smith or 
any other officer or representative of defendant (R. 228). 
Q. Now, this is in February and March and April 
that you talked about in this deal; was it not? 
A. Right. 
Q. Now, you never called Mr. Smith and said to 
Mr. Smith, "Has this been renewed," did you? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact you have never met Mr. Smith; have 
you? 
A. Correct. 
Damages, for loss of the sale to Mr. Jensen and refund 
of the $5,000.00 down payment, resulted because no renewal 
of the contract had been exercised by plaintiffs, and not 
l::ecause of delay in consent. The trial court turned down 
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the plaintiffs' demands for damages. Such decision was 
supported by substantial competent evidence. Even if thi: 
court were to direct the trial court to re-write the Amen,j. 
ment to Lease, it is not our understanding that retroacti':: 
damages could be awarded. 
In January, 1978 this Court again reaffirmed the 
standards on appeal. This was a lease interpretation case, 
Minshew v. Chevron Oil Co., January 30, 1978 -
In analyzing the plaintiff's contentions, 
it is appropriate to have in mind these basic rules 
of review on appeal: that we indulge the findings an: 
judgment of the trial court with a presumption of 
validity and correctness; review the record int~ 
light favorable to them; do not disturb them if they 
find substantial support in the evidence; and require 
1 
plaintiff to sustain the burden of showing error. , 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, defendant-appellant urges that this appeal 
be denied and that the decision of the trial court be affic· 
Appellants have failed to show error on the part of the 
trial judge. No patent ambiguity exists calling for inter· 
pretation of this eight-year period for exercise of the 
renewal right. No showing of fraud or mutual mistake has 
appeared in the record to justify or require a reformatior. 
of the Amendment to Lease. 
proven in the circumstances. 
No damages have been sustainec:: 
f ti Plaintiffs, after lapse 0 ~ 
renewal option period, tried to sell the car wash to Mr. 
fr"' Jensen, but agreed to refund the down payment if a new .. 
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year lease was not procured. The plaintiffs' claim for 
damages is predicated solely upon failure to consent to 
assignment and such has not been proven because the requested 
"consent" really involved a belated request for extension 
of the lease. ~h 
Respectfully submitted this 2..{) day of April, 1978. 
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